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VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AFTER MONSANTO
George A. Hay*
INTRODUCTION
The decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.' repre-
sents the Supreme Court's latest effort to articulate the standards
governing vertical restraints of trade 2 under the United States anti-
trust law.3 It is unlikely that this will be the last time the Court ad-
dresses this topic. Notwithstanding the many Supreme Court
decisions in this area, several issues remain unresolved. Indeed,
Monsanto may have created (or resurrected) as many new questions
as it answered, a phenomenon characteristic of most prior opinions
in this area.
At least part of the reason for this unsettled state is that, from
the outset, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to apply a com-
prehensive analysis to vertical restraints of trade. Rather, in each
case it has applied a simple principle or rule of thumb to a discrete
aspect of the vertical restraint problem. 4 Because of its piecemeal
approach, the Court has failed to appreciate the incompatibility of
these various principles. Hence, in each case one problem may have
been resolved, but one or more new ones were created. 5
* Professor of Law and Economics, Cornell University. B.A. 1963, Le Moyne Col-
lege; M.A. 1967, Ph.D. 1969 Northwestern University.
The Author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Cornell Law
School, the capable research assistance of Susan Hurt, and the patient and efficient sec-
retarial assistance of Chris O'Hara.
1 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).
2 Vertical restraints are imposed by a manufacturer on those distributors or retail-
ers that deal with the manufacturer's product. Such restraints can be price restrictions,
such as prohibitions against retailers selling the manufacturer's product below a set
price, see, e.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 350 U.S. 300 (1919); or nonprice restric-
tions, such as prohibitions against retailers selling outside a designated region, see, e.g.,
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
Horizontal restraints, on the other hand, are price and nonprice restrictions which
are self-imposed by the distributors or retailers. The manufacturer is not a party to the
scheme to maintain a horizontal restraint.
3 Vertical restraints are tried under § I of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982),
which makes "[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade"
illegal. Private plaintiffs may recover treble damages for injury resulting from such vio-
lations under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
4 See Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doctrine and Economics in the Section One Labyrinth:
Is Sylvania a Way Out?, 67 VA. L. REv. 1457 (1981). For a discussion of the tendency of
courts to eschew systematic analysis in favor of simple rules when dealing with antitrust
problems, see Hay, Pigeonholes in Antitrust, 29 THE ANTITRUST BULL. 133 (1984).
5 See Baker, supra note 4, at 1457 ("[Tlhe resulting rules are ajumble of pieces that
simply do not fit together.").
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The process is not likely to reach "equilibrium" until the Court
abandons its piecemeal approach in favor of a comprehensive analy-
sis of vertical restraints. 6 This is not to argue that there is necessar-
ily a single solution to all vertical restraint questions. Nevertheless,
a uniform analysis applied to each question would result in a family
of solutions that are doctrinally consistent.
I
THE LEGAL RULES OF THUMB
A. The Court's Early Hostility towards Vertical Restraints: Dr.
Miles
A brief review of the Court's treatment of vertical restraint
cases serves to identify the principles and rules that have emerged
over the past eighty years, while illustrating the present disarray to
which the Court's piecemeal approach has contributed. The story
begins in 1911 with Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 7
Dr. Miles, a pharmaceutical manufacturing company, sought to en-
force contractual agreements with wholesale and retail dealers of its
products. These agreements prohibited the wholesalers and retail-
ers from selling Dr. Miles's products at prices below those set by Dr.
Miles.8
The Court invalidated thes6 price restrictions, basing its hold-
ing on two principles. The first is that "a general restraint upon
alienation is ordinarily invalid." 9 It follows that a manufacturer may
6 This conclusion is shared by many commentators. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 4;
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pts. 1 & 2),
74 YALE LJ. 775 (1965), 75 YALE LJ. 373 (1966); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme
Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition De-
cisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975).
7 220 U.S. 373 (1911). For earlier cases applying the Sherman Act to resale price
maintenance of goods protected by patent or copyright laws, see Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); Scribner v. Straus, 210 U.S. 352 (1908); John D. Park &
Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907), cert. dismissed, 212 U.S. 588 (1908).
8 Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 378.
9 Id. at 404.
This statement, which was later relied upon in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380 (1967), has been criticized as a misstatement of the law. Han-
dler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review-1967, 53 VA. L. REV. 1667, 1684 (1967) (ar-
guing that common law permitted restraints on alienation "under a variety of
circumstances"). Furthermore, the importance of this rule can be questioned given that
the Dr. Miles Court recognized an exception for patents. 220 U.S. at 400-04.
Under common law, the types of vertical arrangements that were valid if reasonable
included exclusive selling agreements, Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175
U.S. 211 (1899); territorial arrangements, Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement, 125 F. 593
(1903), cert. denied, 192 U.S. 606 (1904); restrictions on those to whom the buyer could
sell or requirements that the purchaser use the product and not resell it, Chicago Sugar
Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948
(1950); and agreements by the seller of a business not to compete with the buyer, see
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not ordinarily dictate the price at which its goods must be resold
once the manufacturer has parted with those goods.' 0
The second principle emerges from the Court's analogy be-
tween Dr. Miles's price restrictions and an agreement among deal-
cases cited in Robinson, Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 45 CORNELL
L.Q 254 (1960).
There are also earlier cases which upheld blatant vertical price fixing restraints, e.g.,
D. Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker, 164 Cal. 355, 128 P. 1041 (1912) (price fixing legitimate
means of achieving product differentiation) and some commentators have asserted that
until 1908, resale price maintenance was legal. E. SELIGMAN & R. LovE, PRICE CutrING
AND PRICE MAINTENANCE (1932); Overstreet & Fisher, Resale Price Maintenance and Dis-
tributional Efficiency: Some Lessons from the Past, Western Economic Ass'n, Int'l 59th
Annual Conference (June 25, 1984). However, the cases cited by these authors, Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); Scribner v. Straus, 210 U.S. 352 (1908);John
D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907), cert. dismissed, 212 U.S. 588
(1908), may not support this assertion.
Those cases involved the claim that the exemption from antitrust law afforded to
patent holders should apply to copyright holders as well. The John D. Park court's rea-
soning indicates that the exemption for patented goods is an exception to the common
law rule against vertical price fixing.
The question. . . is whether the exemption from common-law rules...
and the provisions of the federal anti-trust act, which has been extended
to contracts affecting the sale and resale, the use or the price of articles
made under a patent . . . extend also to articles made under a secret
process ....
. . . It follows therefore that contracts restraining subsequent sales or
use of a patented article which would contravene the common-law rules against
monopolies and restraints of trade, if made in respect of unpatented articles,
are valid because of the monopoly granted by the patent.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 153 F. at 26-28 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the exemption
from antitrust law was denied in all three cases, making the illegality of vertical price
fixing more certain.
10 The Court's discussion suggests that resale price maintenance would be permis-
sible as part of an otherwise legitimate consignment arrangement. This is because in a
consignment arrangement, the manufacturer retains title and thus there is no "aliena-
tion." While in some consignment arrangements, such as a real estate listing, it is desir-
able to permit the original owner to dictate the retail price, the consignment exception is
problematical because it provides an incentive to create "sham" consignments to cir-
cumvent the rule against restraint upon alienation. A further problem with this excep-
tion is that a vertically integrated firm can determine its own retail price, possibly
creating an incentive to integrate. Although sham consignment arrangements can be
uncovered, integration undertaken to circumvent the rule poses a dilemma because ver-
tical integration itself is not discouraged.
In United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), the Court upheld a
consignment agreement in which the manufacturer determined prices. The opinion
used language reflecting the rule against restraint on alienation. The Court determined
that the arrangement was one of consignment or agency rather than sale, because title to
the products passed directly to the consumer without ever vesting in the agent. Id. at
484.
Then in Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), the Court ruled that a man-
ufacturer may not use a consignment arrangement to avoid § 4 of the Clayton Act. The
Court struck down an arrangement seeking to restrict "nominal 'consignees' who are in
reality small struggling competitors seeking retail. . . customers." Id. at 21. Although
the Court did not provide a concrete test for distinguishing between a legitimate con-
signment and a sham, it was clear that the form of the transaction was not determinative.
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ers to set their own minimum prices. The Court observed that a
requirement by the manufacturer that all dealers adhere to specified
minimum prices is identical in its effect on dealer prices to a hori-
zontal scheme among the dealers to adhere to those prices. The
Court reasoned that these two forms of dealer price restrictions
should be treated similarly.11 Because, even in 1911, it was clear
that a horizontal agreement among dealers to fix prices would be
improper,' 2 the Court concluded that Dr. Miles's vertical price re-
striction should also be illegal. 13
A major problem with the Court's analogy between Dr. Miles's
Id. at 22-23. The Court attempted to distinguish General Electric on the ground that the
goods involved in that case were patented. Id. at 23-24.
Three years later, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967),
the Court revived the importance of the transaction's form. The Court stated that a rule
of reason would apply to those nonprice restrictions on products over which the manu-
facturer had "retain[ed] title, dominion, and risk," while per se illegality would apply to
restrictions on articles which were sold. At the same time, however, the Court implied
that, under Simpson, a consignment which fixes prices would meet a stricter standard of
validity. Id. at 380. It follows that a price fixing consignment may still be invalidated
under a per se rule, while a nonprice consignment arrangement is likely to be judged by
a rule of reason. The Court found that the net effect of the consignment arrangements
was to preserve competition and therefore upheld them. Id. at 382. It struck down the
nonconsignment arrangements because such restrictions frequently restrict output. Id.
Ten years later in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977),
the Court criticized the Schwinn decision for reducing the issue to passage of title, and
questioned the presumption that competition is harmed when restrictions are incorpo-
rated in a sale agreement, but benefitted when those same restrictions are included in a
consignment arrangement. By holding that all nonprice restraints are subject to the rule
of reason, id. at 54, Sylvania eliminates the distinction between sale and consignment
agreements incorporating nonprice restrictions. However, the Court left open the ques-
tion of when price restraints which are part of a consignment arrangement will be
judged per se illegal.
11 Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408 ("The [manufacturer] can fare no better with its plan of
identical contracts than could the dealers themselves if they formed a combination and
endeavored to establish the same restrictions, and thus to achieve the same result, by
agreement with each other.").
12 At that time, horizontal price fixing had not been labelled illegal per se, but there
was no doubt about the substantive rule. The Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), indicated that a "reasonableness defense" was not available
for price fixing. Id. at 64-65.
13 Although Dr. Miles focuses on price fixing, the Court's reasoning suggests a more
general rule: A vertical restraint violates the Sherman Act when it produces the same
result as an invalid horizontal agreement. This rule makes no distinction between price
and nonprice restraints. It follows that vertical nonprice restraints should be treated as
harshly as vertical price restrictions. For example, under this rule, territorial restrictions
imposed on the dealers by the manufacturer would be invalid because a horizontal
agreement among dealers to stay out of each other's territory would violate the Sherman
Act.
The question of whether price and nonprice restraints should be treated similarly
remains unsettled. The Court on several occasions has rejected the idea of symmetry.
See infra notes 48-63 and accompanying text. Today there is considerable support for




vertical restrictions and a horizontal agreement among the distribu-
tors is that it fails to provide a coherent rationale for the manufac-
turer's interest in enforcing a vertical restraint. Ceteris paribus, a
dealers' cartel injures the manufacturer, whether price or nonprice
restraints are used, because any agreement that permits higher retail
margins will normally reduce the total number of units sold and
consequently reduce the manufacturer's profit. Vertical restrictions
presumably provide a net benefit to the manufacturer, however, be-
cause the manufacturer initiates them.' 4 Therefore, it cannot be the
case that vertical restraints always have precisely the same effect as
horizontal restraints.
A tidal wave of subsequent economic literature elaborated upon
this distinction. 15 Although dealers will almost always wish to re-
strict competition among themselves, manufacturers, in general, are
better off if their dealers compete vigorously, driving retail margins
to the minimum sustainable under competition. The manufacturer
will benefit from diminished price rivalry among its dealers only in
certain unusual circumstances. In those circumstances, the higher
dealer margins must generate some other effect on sales that more
than compensates for the sales lost due to higher retail prices.
The Dr. Miles Court danced around the edges of this insight,
but never fully embraced it.16 Only many years later, benefitting
14 Where the dealers have some market power vis-a-vis the manufacturer, the deal-
ers could possibly coerce the manufacturer into instituting vertical restraints. The
sweep of the Court's language suggests, however, that it was not limiting its analysis or
its legal rules to this special situation. Moreover, subsequent cases suggest that the
Court does not generally view the dealers' bargaining strength as superior to that of
manufacturers. For example, in Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 21 (1964), the
Court found that dealers were "coercively laced into an arrangement under which their
supplier [was] able to impose noncompetitive prices on thousands of persons whose
prices otherwise might be competitive." In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365 (1967), the Court found that "[tihe source of the restrictions is the manufac-
turer. These are not horizontal restraints, in which the actors are distributors with or
without the manufacturer's participation." Id. at 372. The Court in Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), also stressed the economic interest of
manufacturers in instituting the restraint.
15 E.g., Baker, supra note 4; Bork, supra note 6; Handler, supra note 9; Pitofsky, In
Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1487 (1983); Posner, supra note 6; Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Eco-
nomic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 506 (1965); Scherer,
The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 687 (1983); Telser, Why Should Man-
ufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. L. & ECON. 86 (1960); Letter from Assistant Attorney
General William F. Baxter to William K. Daines of the American Retail Federation, re-
printed in 14 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. No. 4, at 14 (1982).
16 The Court stated:
[T]he advantage of established retail prices primarily concerns the deal-
ers. The enlarged profits which would result from adherence to the es-
tablished rates would go to them and not to the [manufacturer]. . . . If
there be an advantage to a manufacturer in the maintenance of fixed re-
tail prices, the question remains whether it is one which he is entitled to
422 [Vol. 66:418
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from the economic literature that ensued, did the Court begin to
develop a reasonably coherent rationale for the manufacturer's in-
terest in vertical restraints,1 7 one which would pose a challenge to
the similar legal treatment of vertical and horizontal restraints.
B. The Colgate Defense and Its Limitations
In United States v. Colgate & Co., 18 the Court appeared to shed
some of its hostility towards vertical restraints. The facts of the case
do not differ substantially from those in cases where courts have
found Sherman Act violations. 19 Nevertheless, the Colgate Court
found no antitrust violation.20
The Court confined itself to the district court's interpretation of
the indictment. 2' According to the Court, the district court inter-
preted the indictment as failing to charge defendants with "selling
its products to dealers under agreements which obligated the [deal-
ers] not to resell except at prices fixed by the [manufacturer]. ' 22
The indictment merely charged that the defendant specified resale
prices and refused to sell to dealers failing to maintain those
prices.2 3 The Court then concluded:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
the [Sherman A]ct does not restrict the long recognized right of
trader or manufacturer . . . freely to exercise his own independ-
ent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of
course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under
which he will refuse to sell.24
Because of the peculiar circumstances under which the Court
secure by agreements restricting the freedom of trade on the part of deal-
ers who own what they sell.
220 U.S. at 407.
17 See infra notes 43-68 and accompanying text.
18 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
19 Colgate, a producer of soaps and toilet articles, attempted to maintain a mini-
mum price for its goods by urging dealers to adhere to Colgate's uniform prices and
requesting that they inform Colgate of dealers that sold at other prices. Colgate an-
nounced that it would not sell to those who did not adhere to its prices and that it would
put violators on "suspended lists." Both suspended and new dealers were asked to as-
sure future compliance. Id. at 303.
At least one commentator suggests that, under the facts of Colgate, the plaintiff
would have had no difficulty establishing an agreement if one had been alleged. Baker,
supra note 4, at 1474-75.
20 250 U.S. at 306-07.
21 " 'We must accept [the district court's] interpretation of the indictments and
confine our review to the question of the construction of the statute involved.' " 250
U.S. at 301 (quoting United States v. Carter, 231 U.S. 492, 493 (1913)).
22 Id. at 307.
23 See id. at 305-06.
24 Id. at 307.
1985] 423
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
decided the case, the scope of Colgate has always been unclear.25
Narrowly construed, Colgate merely holds that under section 1 of the
Sherman Act a plaintiff must allege an agreement between the man-
ufacturer and dealers. If read more broadly, however, Colgate limits
the application of the Sherman Act in the area of vertical
restraints. 26
Subsequently, in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 27 the Court
suggested that limitations imposed by Colgate were not very signifi-
cant. 28 The Court emphasized that the Sherman Act extended to
situations in which no formal contractual restraint exists: "[A]n un-
lawful combination is not just such as arises from a price mainte-
nance agreement, express or implied; such a combination is also
organized if the producer secures adherence to his suggested prices
by means which go beyond his mere declination to sell to a cus-
tomer who will not observe his announced policy." 29 The dissent,
favoring a broader reading of Colgate, stated that "the Court has
done no less than send to its demise the Colgate doctrine .. . -30
Cases that followed continued to restrict Colgate.31 These cases
indicate that the agreement required by Colgate may be easily
25 Soon after the Dr. miles decision, legislators began reviving the manufacturer's
right to maintain prices. Thus, in the years immediately following Colgate, there was
little litigation involving resale price maintenance. See Baker, supra note 4, at 1478-81,
nn.76-79 (discussing some post-Colgate cases).
California enacted the first "fair trade" law in 1931, followed by a majority of states.
Under these laws, manufacturers could enforce contracts whereby dealers agreed not to
sell at below a fair price. Nonsigner provisions allowed manufacturers to enforce price
contracts even against price cutters who had not agreed, provided that any reseller in
the state had agreed.
The Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693, amended § I of the Sherman
Act to allow these contracts in interstate commerce if valid under state law. However, in
1951, the Supreme Court limited the application of the Act to actual parties to the con-
tract. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 387-90 (1951). The
following year, Congress amended § 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 95 (1982), with
the McGuire Bill, ch. 745, §§ 1, 2, 66 Stat. 632 (1952), allowing enforcement against
both signers and nonsigners distributing goods in interstate commerce. Meanwhile,
some states repealed their Fair Trade acts and others repealed nonsigner provisions,
thereby curtailing the sweep of the McGuire Bill. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 16902(a)(1) (West 1983). The McGuire Bill and the Miller-Tydings Act were repealed
in 1975. Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801 (1975).
26 See Baker, supra note 4, at 1476-77 (arguing that Court was establishing substan-
tive rights for manufacturer rather than merely reiterating the technical requirement of
proper § 1 pleading).
27 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
28 See id. at 44.
29 Id. at 43.
30 Id. at 49 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
31 See, e.g., George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790
(2d Cir. 1960) (suggesting that "[t]he Supreme Court has left a narrow channel through
which a manufacturer may pass even though the facts would have to be of such Doric
simplicity as to be somewhat rare in this day of complex business enterprise").
424 [Vol. 66:418
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shown.32 For example, if a manufacturer enlisted dealers to police a
price maintenance scheme,33 threatened to terminate noncomplying
dealers, 34 or offered reinstatement to dealers previously termi-
nated,3 5 Colgate's agreement requirement would be satisfied. Conse-
quently, few cases arose in which a manufacturer successfully
invoked the Colgate defense.36
In Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC,37 the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) sought to end all ambiguity about the limited scope
of Colgate, and in effect to eliminate the defense altogether.38 The
case raised the question of whether a manufacturer who coerced
dealers to sell at the manufacturer's suggested minimum prices by
threatening to terminate noncomplying dealers constituted an
agreement in violation of the Sherman Act.39 The FTC concluded
that this conduct was illegal. The Commission reconciled its conclu-
sion with Colgate by reasoning that Colgate only protects a manufac-
turer's right to initially select its customers. 40
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit rejected the FTC's narrow inter-
pretation of Colgate. The court held that a manufacturer can termi-
32 In Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), a newspaper company termi-
nated a carrier for overcharging and then hired another carrier to solicit sales away from
the terminated carrier. The Court found that the newspaper's conduct was not unilat-
eral and therefore not protected by Colgate.
In Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979), the court
found an unlawful combination when a manufacturer terminated one dealer at the urg-
ing of another. The court ruled that "[w]hen a marketing decision, although ostensibly
taken by a manufacturer, is in fact the result of pressure from another customer, such a
decision must be scrutinized more closely than solely unilateral action might be." Id. at
168.
33 See Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 651, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
34 See George W. Warner & Co., 277 F.2d at 788.
35 See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 148.
36 One approach that succeeded was proof that no coercion was present in the pric-
ing policies. For example, in Enbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 714 (D. Kan.
1962), the court relied on testimony by the terminated franchisee that he alone deter-
mined his prices despite the manufacturer's suggestions. Id. at 719. Similarly, in United
States v. O.M. Scott & Sons, Co., 303 F. Supp. 141 (D.D.C. 1969), a manufacturer who
preticketed its products was not found to have caused any dealer to change its normal
course of business because, even though discounting occurred, no dealers were termi-
nated. Id. at 154. The general trend, however, has been to narrow Colgate by expanding
the term "combination" under § 1 of the Sherman Act. See Baker, supra note 4, at 1477-
83; Comment, The Colgate Doctrine: Its Past and Present, 12 Hous. L. REV. 409, 414
(1975).
37 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983).
38 Apparently, the case was deliberately structured to test the Colgate doctrine. "Pe-
titioner and the Commission agree that the continuing vitality of the doctrine an-
nounced in United States v. Colgate & Co. is the sole issue on appeal." 718 F.2d at 256-57.
A footnote to this passage adds: "It is clear that complaint counsel framed the proof of
their case to require a decision dealing squarely with the meaning of the Colgate doc-
trine." Id. at 257 n.1.
39 Id. at 256-57.
40 Id. at 258.
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nate, or threaten to terminate, noncomplying dealers, even if the
threat of termination induces dealers to adhere to the suggested
minimum prices.4 1 The court did not, however, specifically state
whether an agreement could have been found on the facts, leaving
some ambiguity about whether it viewed Colgate as going beyond the
mere evidentiary requirement to find an agreement and granting a
substantive right to the manufacturer to engage in certain forms of
vertical restraints. Nevertheless, it is certain that whether Colgate is
read narrowly or broadly, a tension exists between the Colgate doc-
trine and the judicial hostility towards vertical restraints. 42
C. Manufacturer's Motive as a Possible Justification
A further conflict with the principles dictating hostility towards
vertical restraints began to emerge in White Motor Co. v. United
States.43 The manufacturer, White Motor, restricted the territories
within which its distributors or dealers could sell and limited the
persons or classes of persons to whom they could sell.44 The De-
partment of Justice argued that such restaints violated the Sherman
Act. This position is consistent with the rationale behind the Dr.
Miles decision. The challenged restrictions were obviously restraints
on alienation; furthermore, a horizontal agreement among the deal-
ers achieving the same territorial restrictions would be per se ille-
gal. 45 Thus, if the Dr. Miles test were applied, White Motor's
territorial restrictions would violate the Sherman Act. The Supreme
Court found, however, that the restrictions were not unlawful per
se,
4 6 with some of the discussion suggesting a willingness to con-
sider the manufacturer's motives for instituting vertical nonprice
restraints. 47
41 Id. at 260.
42 Even the Russell Stover court acknowledged the tension between Colgate and the
judicial hostility towards vertical restraints. Id. at 259 n.5.
43 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
44 Id. at 255.
45 Id. at 266 & n.3. The case also involved price restraints; however, the district
court's view that these were per se illegal was affirmed by the Court. Id. at 260.
46 In reversing the trial court's summary judgment, the Court stated:
We conclude that the summary judgment, apart from the price-fixing
phase of the case, was improperly employed in this suit. Apart from price
fixing, we do not intimate any view on the merits. We only hold that the
legality of the territorial and customer limitations should be determined
only after a trial.
Id. at 264.
47 See id. at 256-59. One result, as Justice Clark's dissent suggests, is that the sym-
metry between the treatment of price restraints and that of nonprice restraints is broken.
This Court. . . has never held whether there is a difference between
market divisions voluntarily undertaken by a manufacturer. . . and those
of dealers in a commodity, agreed upon by themselves. . . . [The manu-
facturer] seems to place some halo around its agreements because they
426 [Vol. 66:418
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This apparent retreat from the rigid rules implied by Dr. Miles
was short-lived. Four years later, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 48 the Court partially restored the restraint on alienation princi-
ple. It held that territorial restrictions by the manufacturer were per
se violations of the Sherman Act for the portion of Schwinn's busi-
ness involving sales of the bicycles to dealers. Astonishingly, the
Court applied the rule of reason to Schwinn's consignment sales.49
The Court reasoned that the same territorial restrictions might pro-
mote competition when sales are made on consignment. 50 The
Court never explained why these restrictions are "so obviously de-
structive of competition" when the manufacturer parts with title and
yet are procompetitive when there is a consignment arrangement. 51
The Court's rehabilitation of the restraint on alienation princi-
ple did not last long. The Court in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylva-
nia, Inc.52 recognized the irrationality of treating restraints as per se
unlawful when the manufacturer parts with title but otherwise sub-
jecting them to the rule of reason.53 Emphasizing the importance of
are vertical. But the intended and actual effect is the same as, if not even
more destructive than, a [horizontal] price fixing agreement or any of its
per se counterparts.
Id. at 279 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Clark went on to quote from the portion of the Dr. Miles opinion analogizing the
effects of manufacturer and dealer imposed restrictions. Id. at 282 (Clark, J., dissenting)
(quoting Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408).
48 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
49 [W]here a manufacturer sells products to his distributor subject to territo-
rial restrictions upon resale, a per se violation of the Sherman Act re-
sults .... Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a
manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom
an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion
over it .... Such restraints are so obviously destructive of competition
that their mere existence is enough. If the manufacturer parts with do-
minion over his product or transfers risk of loss to another, he may not
reserve control over its destiny or the conditions of its resale.
Id. at 379 (emphasis in original).
50 Id. at 379-80. See Baker, supra note 4, at 1461.
51 See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 246 (2d ed. 1981) (noting this ap-
parent anomaly).
52 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
53 The Sylvania Court was quite critical of Schwinn's reliance on the restraint on
alienation principle.
The [Schwinn] Court also stated that to impose vertical restrictions in
sale transactions would "violate the ancient rule against restraints on
alienation." . . . This isolated reference has provoked sharp criticism
from virtually all of the commentators on the decision, most of whom
have regarded the Court's apparent reliance on the "ancient rule" as
both a misreading of legal history and a perversion of antitrust analy-
sis. . . . We quite agree with MR. JUSTICE STEwART's dissenting com-
ment in Schwinn that "the state of the common law 400 or even 100 years
ago is irrelevant ot the issue before us: the effect of the antitrust laws
upon vertical distributional restraints in the American economy today."
Id. at 53 n.21.
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using economic analysis rather than "formalistic line drawing," the
Court declared that all vertical nonprice restraints should be ana-
lyzed by the rule of reason. 54
The Sylvania Court also went further than previous opinions in
explaining why, under certain circumstances, a manufacturer might
benefit from limited competition among its dealers. 55 For instance,
manufacturers can use restrictions to induce retailers to provide
services or repair facilities, and engage in promotional activities. 56
Although these restraints diminish intrabrand competition, they in-
crease interbrand competition to the extent that such restraints en-
hance the attractiveness of the manufacturer's product.57
However, in utilizing its analysis of the manufacturer's motive
to provide a rationale for subjecting all nonprice vertical restraints
to the rule of reason, the Court failed to take this analysis of the
manufacturer's motives to what some economists argue is its logical
conclusion. These critics maintain that if the manufacturer freely
and independently implements the restraints, they should be pre-
sumed to promote interbrand competition because the restraints
improve the attractiveness of the product more than would lower
prices resulting from intrabrand competition. 58 The obvious con-
clusion to this argument is that vertical restraints should never be
held to violate the antitrust laws. Instead, the Court applied a rule
of reason analysis to all vertical nonprice restraints. 59 Unless the
Court intended that the rule of reason analysis would be used sim-
54 Although the restraint in Sylvania was merely a location clause, the Court clearly
intended to require rule of reason analysis for all nonprice restraints. The Court
claimed that this was the rule before Schwinn. Id. at 57. Perhaps the Court was referring
to the four years between White Motor and Schwinn.
55 433 U.S. at 54-55.
56 See id. at 55.
57 See id. at 54 ("Vertical restrictions reduce intrabrand competition. . . . Vertical
restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve
certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products. These 'redeeming virtues' are
implicit in every decision sustaining vertical restrictions under the rule of reason.").
58 See, e.g., Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per
Se Legality, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 6, 22-23 (1981) (arguing that courts should adopt per se
legality standard for vertical restraints).
59 433 U.S. at 57-59.
The Court provided no guidelines in applying this rule of reason analysis. See Pos-
ner, supra note 59, at 14-18; Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Nonprice Verti-
cal Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. R~v. 1 (1978).
On remand, the Ninth Circuit stated that the rule of reason analysis requires an
inquiry into whether the restraint promotes or suppresses competition. Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 694 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1982). Other courts have
applied the rule of reason differently. See, e.g., Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068,
1076 (2d Cir. 1980) (weighing enhancement of interbrand competition against loss of
intrabrand competition); H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239,
242 (5th Cir. 1978) (requiring plaintiff to show defendant has achieved monopoly or
that there is probability of monopolization); Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Thorofare Mkts.,
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ply to screen out situations where the restraint is actually imposed
on the manufacturer by the dealers or where the restraint results
from or is intended to facilitate collusion among manufacturers, it
appears as though the Court was concerned that the restraint might
actually diminish interbrand competition even where the restraint is
freely and independently chosen by the manufacturer. 60
In addition, the Court focused its challenge of the Dr. Miles doc-
trine on nonprice restraints only. 6' However, "free rider" 62 con-
cerns that motivate manufacturers to impose nonprice restraints
might lead them to institute resale price maintenance as well.63
Therefore, if the Court had actually based its decision entirely on an
appreciation of the manufacturer's motives for implementing a re-
straint, it is unlikely that the Court would have drawn such a sharp
distinction between price and nonprice restraints.
D. Analytic and Evidentiary Problems Created by Sylvania
The effect of Sylvania was to eliminate the unsatisfactory distinc-
tion between nonprice restraints where manufacturers part with title
and the identical nonprice restraints incorporated into consignment
arrangements, but in the process to introduce two new distinctions.
The first distinction is between price and nonprice restraints; the
second is between nonprice restraints that promote interbrand com-
petition and those that restrict it. Furthermore, Sylvania failed to
justify or eliminate two previously existing distinctions. The first is
between price restraints resulting from an express agreement be-
tween the manufacturer and the dealers and those resulting from
the manufacturer's refusal to sell to dealers who fail to adhere to the
manufacturer's suggested price. The second is between price re-
straints contained in an agreement whereby the manufacturer parts
Inc., 587 F.2d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 1978) (instructing court below to consider purpose of
restraint, structure of industry, and strength of competition).
60 Another interpretation is that the Court wants to balance the loss in intrabrand
competition against the gain in interbrand competition. As Frank Easterbrook points
out, the idea that there is a balance to be struck lacks analytical support. If the restraint
makes the product more attractive to consumers than competing products (i.e., inter-
brand competition is enhanced), consumers are by definition better off, and even though
intrabrand competition has been altered, no adverse consequences to consumers result
from that alteration. Hence, there is no harm to be weighed against the gain. See Easter-
brook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTrrRUsT LJ. 135 (1984).
61 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
62 See infra text accompanying notes 76-77.
63 The opinion contains only a passing effort to justify the disparate treatment of
price and nonprice vertical restraints. Although the Court recognized that "commenta-
tors have argued that the manufacturer's motivation for imposing vertical price restric-
tions may be the same as for nonprice restrictions," the Court maintained that there are
"significant differences that could easily justify different treatment." 433 U.S. at 51
n.18. See Posner, supra note 6, at 292-93.
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with title and those incorporated into consignment agreements. 64
In retrospect, it is easy to see how the Court's preference for
simple rules of thumb rather than a comprehensive economic analy-
sis could have produced such complex distinctions. Nevertheless,
the end result is unfortunate. To the extent these distinctions are
analytically unsupportable, they will undoubtedly generate inconsis-
tent, and sometimes incorrect, results from the perspective of the
theorist. Some legitimate behavior will be penalized while some an-
ticompetitive conduct will escape condemnation. 65
This result is an inevitable consequence of every "bright line"
rule. It is often tolerated because the increased predictability and
reduced administrative costs that result from the rule more than
compensate for the costs of under or over inclusion. 66 In the area of
vertical restraints, however, simple rules of thumb do not necessar-
ily reduce administrative costs. In part, this is because the various
"pigeonholes" the Court has suggested as a way to sort out lawful
and unlawful conduct have not been particularly well-defined from
an evidentiary standpoint.
For example, the disparate treatment of price and nonprice re-
straints requires courts to classify the restraints as price or nonprice.
Although this distinction appears simple, it has proven more diffi-
cult than originally anticipated. The problem is exacerbated be-
cause there is an incentive for plaintiffs to argue that facially
nonprice restrictions are designed to control the retail price and
should therefore be categorized as price restraints. Similarly, it is
exceedingly difficult for a court to determine whether a diminution
in price cutting stems from an agreement between the manufacturer
and the dealers or is merely the result of a manufacturer exercising
its Colgate rights. Consequently, the Court's bright line rules regard-
ing vertical restraints have decreased the predictability of outcomes
and increased administrative costs by creating confusing evidentiary
requirements. The Court in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. 67
focused on these evidentiary problems. 68
64 Courts must also distinguish between vertical nonprice restraints, imposed by
the manufacturer on the dealers, and horizontal nonprice restraints, initiated by the
dealers themselves, since the latter are per se unlawful. See Baker, supra note 4, at 1488-
1515 (discussing this distinction).
65 As a result, business decisionmakers will choose safer, although probably less
efficient, behavior. For instance, manufacturers may opt to consign the product to dis-
tributors rather than sell outright, or may impose exclusive territories in lieu of mini-
mum resale prices.
66 The per se rule for horizontal price fixing is an example of a preferable bright
line rule.
67 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).
68 The Solicitor General and several other amici attempted to raise the issue of
whether vertical price fixing agreements should be per se illegal. The Court declined
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E. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.-Clarification or
Further Confusion?
Spray-Rite was a wholesale distributor of agricultural chemicals
including herbicides manufactured by Monsanto. After Monsanto
terminated Spray-Rite's distributorship, Spray-Rite brought suit
against Monsanto under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Spray-Rite
alleged that Monsanto conspired with some of its distributors to fix
the prices of Monsanto's products and that Monsanto had termi-
nated Spray-Rite in furtherance of that conspiracy. 69
The district court instructed the jury that Monsanto's conduct
was per se unlawful if it was in furtherance of a price fixing conspir-
acy. Spray-Rite produced evidence that before the termination,
other distributors had complained that Spray-Rite was selling Mon-
santo products below the suggested prices. The jury, answering
special interrogatories, found that the termination was pursuant to a
vertical price fixing agreement. 70
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's de-
nial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict. 7 ' The court based
its holding on the fact established at trial that Monsanto terminated
Spray-Rite in response to or following complaints about the price
cutting by other distributors. 72 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit's
holding implies that price cutting by a distributor, followed by com-
plaints by other distributors and termination of the price cutting dis-
tributor by the manufacturer, would be a sufficient basis for an
inference both that a vertical price fixing agreement existed and that
the distributor's termination was in furtherance of that agreement.
1. The Criteria for a New Evidentiary Requirement
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment against
Monsanto, 78 it explicitly rejected the Seventh Circuit's standard of
the invitation to address this question since neither party to the case had argued in the
district court or on appeal that the rule of reason should apply to a vertical price fixing
conspiracy. Id. at 1469 n.7.
69 Id. at 1465.
70 Id. at 1467.
71 Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1233 (7th Cir. 1982).
72 Id. at 1238.
73 The Court found "substantial direct evidence of agreements to rvaintain prices."
104 S. Ct. at 1471 (emphasis in original). This evidence consisted of communications
between Monsanto and price cutting distributors in which Monsanto threatened to with-
hold adequate supplies if the price cutting continued. Furthermore, at least one distrib-
utor expressly agreed to adhere to Monsanto's suggested price. Given the'existence of
an agreement, the Court concluded that a jury could reasonably find that Spray-Rite's
termination was a result of that agreement since "it is necessary for competing distribu-
tors contemplating compliance with suggested prices to know that those who do not
comply will be terminated." Id. at 1472. In addition, the Court found circumstantial
evidence of a direct link between Spray-Rite's price cutting and its termination in that
1985]
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proof.7 4 The Court found that standard to be deficient in two re-
spects. First, it could effectively undermine the manufacturer's
right, established in Sylvania, to impose nonprice restraints, subject
only to the rule of reason. 75 Second, it could vitiate the manufac-
turer's right established in Colgate to refuse to deal with price cutting
dealers and to announce this policy to potential dealers. 76
Problems inherent in the Seventh Circuit's approach may be il-
lustrated in the following scenario. A manufacturer imposes costly
nonprice restrictions. A dealer who does not abide by those restric-
tions, a "free rider," will have lower costs, and consequently will be
able to charge lower prices and still make a profit. These lower
prices directly threaten dealers who are abiding by the restrictions.
As a result, those dealers will complain to the manufacturer. Their
complaints will likely focus on the price cutting rather than on the
free rider's noncompliance with the nonprice restrictions, because
the price cutting threatens them more directly and is more noticea-
ble than the free rider's noncompliance with nonprice restrictions.
Because the free rider is not honoring the nonprice restrictions
(presumed to be legitimate), the manufacturer apparently has a
valid reason for termination. Yet, if the manufacturer terminates
the free rider after the dealers' complaints, the Seventh Circuit's
standard allows the jury to infer that a price agreement exists.
Therefore, under this standard a manufacturer will be reluctant to
terminate a dealer for failing to comply with a legitimate nonprice
restraint if the manufacturer receives a price-related complaint con-
cerning that dealer before it initiates the termination process.
Moreover, Colgate allows the manufacturer to not deal with, and
presumably to terminate dealers, who refuse to comply with the
manufacturer's suggested prices whether or not they comply with
nonprice restrictions. A manufacturer who combines suggested re-
sale prices with costly nonprice restraints will probably receive com-
plaints from dealers about another dealer's price cutting. However,
the mere receipt of complaints which "arise in the normal course of
business and do not indicate illegal concerted action" 77 should not
cause the manufacturer to forfeit its Colgate rights. The Court rea-
soned that "[t]o bar a manufacturer from acting solely because the
information upon which it acts originated as a price complaint
Monsanto sought agreement at a time when herbicide was in short supply. Id. at 1471
n.10.
74 Id. at 1468.
75 Id. at 1469 n.6.
76 Id. at 1470.
77 Id. (quoting Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 671 F.2d 1168, 1172 (8th Cir.
1982), aff'd on rehearing, 712 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1983)).
432 [Vol. 66:418
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
would create an irrational dislocation in the market."78
The Monsanto Court sought an evidentiary standard that distin-
guishes a manufacturer's independent action or concerted action on
nonprice restrictions from an invalid vertical price fixing agree-
ment.79 Such a standard is needed to preserve the rules of thumb
inherited from prior decisions: price agreements are per se illegal;
vertical nonprice agreements are subject to the rule of reason; and a
manufacturer has the right, absent a monopoly, to choose with
whom it will deal.80 The Court's opinion fails, however, to offer any
specific guidance as to how such a standard should be formulated.
Indeed, in discussing its proposed alternative,81 the Court says
nothing about how to distinguish between price and nonprice re-
straints. Furthermore, the Court's only advice regarding how to dis-
tinguish a manufacturer's independent action from a concerted
price agreement is given in a brief footnote.8 2 In a remarkable ad-
mission, the Court acknowledges that making the appropriate dis-
tinctions may be difficult in practice and that the distinctions may
have no economic significance. 3 Nevertheless, by retaining its rules
of thumb, the Court evidently believes that these distinctions are
both feasible and appropriate.
2. Problems Created by Monsanto
The failure of the Court to provide more detailed guidance will
undoubtedly create difficulties for lower courts in applying the Mon-
santo decision. This problem is exacerbated by the Court's acknowl-
78 Id.
'79 Id. at 1469-70.
80 See id. at 1470.
81 The Court stressed that there must be evidence that tends to exclude the possi-
bility of independent action by the manufacturer and distributor. That is, there must be
"direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer
and others 'had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an
unlawful objective.'" Id. at 1471 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco,
Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)).
82 The concept of "a meeting of the minds" or "a common scheme" in a
distributor-termination case includes more than a showing that the dis-
tributor conformed to the suggested price. It means as well that evidence
must be presented both that the distributor communicated its acquies-
cence or agreement, and that this was sought by the manufacturer.
Id. at 1471 n.9.
83 While these distinctions in theory are reasonably clear, often they are dif-
ficult to apply in practice. In Sylvania we emphasized that the legality of
arguably anticompetitive conduct should be judged primarily by its "mar-
ket impact.". . . But the economic effect of all of the conduct described
above-unilateral and concerted vertical price-setting, agreements on
price and non-price restrictions-is in many, but not all, cases similar or
identical. . . . And judged from a distance, the conduct of the parties in




edgment that the economic effects of price and nonprice restrictions
are often indistinguishable, as are those of a manufacturer's individ-
ual actions and concerted actions. Otherwise, an effect-oriented
analysis might have provided a suitable basis for distinction. Under
such analysis, a system of exclusive retail territories would be per se
unlawful because it would produce the same effect as a retail price
maintenance scheme; that is, it would insulate the dealers from in-
trabrand price competition. However, the Court's insistence on dis-
tinguishing between price and nonprice restraints,8 4 despite their
identical economic effects, precludes such an approach.
As a result, the price-nonprice distinction seems to be an exer-
cise in semantics. A manufacturer may, subject to the rule of rea-
son, implement nonprice restraints for the purpose, and with the
effect, of eliminating intrabrand price competition.8 5 The manufac-
turer who attempts to accomplish the same result by setting retail
prices directly, however, is violating the Sherman Act per se. Hence
the jury's characterization of the restraint as price or nonprice deter-
mines the manufacturer's fate. Unfortunately, the Court provides
no guidelines as to how this labeling should be done.
Moreover, the Monsanto Court's revitalization of the Colgate doc-
trine heightens the importance of this characterization. Most
facially nonprice restraints, such as exclusive territories or areas of
primary responsibility with a profit passover agreement, will require
contractual intercourse between the manufacturer and its dealers.
Consequently, the plaintiff will have little difficulty establishing the
existence of an agreement between manufacturer and dealers. In
the face of an agreement, the manufacturer cannot raise the Colgate
defense that it was taking unilateral action. Therefore, the plaintiff
will focus on these restraints and seek to characterize them as price
agreements.
In most other respects, the defendant's position is strengthened
by the Monsanto opinion. This is particularly true as regards the de-
fendant's use of the Colgate doctrine to resist the inference of the
price agreement from circumstantial evidence. Indeed, the impact
of the Monsanto Court's reaffirmation of Colgate, combined with its
endorsement of Sylvania's price-nonprice distinction may be to
breathe more life into Colgate than it had even in 1918. This occurs
because, in the Court's view, situations where dealers are subject to
costly nonprice restraints are conducive to dealer complaints about
price cutting even without any obligation or pressure from the man-
ufacturer to do so. Therefore, the Court's argument concludes,
84 Id.
85 This is because eliminating price competition will have some additional impact
that will promote sales of the product. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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dealer complaints alone do not create an inference that a price
agreement exists.
In addition, the Court's approach reduces the relevance of
dealer termination in establishing the existence of a price agreement
where nonprice restraints exist. The termination will instead be at-
tributed to the manufacturer's enforcement of the nonprice re-
straints absent evidence to the contrary. Alternatively, when the
dealer complied with every nonprice obligation, the termination
may be attributed to the manufacturer's legitimate refusal to deal
with price cutting dealers.
Finally, the Court's requirement that evidence be presented
"both that the distributor communicated its acquiescence or agree-
ment, and that this was sought by the manufacturer"8' 6 also in-
creases a plaintiff's burden in establishing a price agreement.
Although the Court did not define its terms, this remark suggests
that something close to a formal offer and acceptance is necessary,
and that the distributor's mere adherence to the suggested price is
not an adequate acceptance. Thus, a plaintiff must show more than
that the threat of termination induced a distributor (silently) to com-
ply in order to establish that a price agreement existed between the
manufacturer and the distributor.
The underlying rationale behind this requirement is not imme-
diately apparent. The contract, combination, or conspiracy lan-
guage of the Sherman Act does not dictate this result. The Court
would not have strained common usage or precedent if it had found
that a manufacturer's refusal to deal with distributors or its threat of
such action resulting in distributors' compliance with announced
policy constituted concerted action.8 7 Similarly, economic analysis
cannot explain this result because the economic effect of the distrib-
utors' compliance is identical to that of a formal agreement. Rather,
the Monsanto Court seems to confer an elevated independent status
for the manufacturer's right to refuse to deal, despite the analytical
and practical difficulties created by such an evidentiary
requirement.8"
86 104 S. Ct. at 1471 n.9.
87 See Baker, supra note 4, at 1474; see also United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362
U.S. 29, 49 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Precedent for allowing compliance by dealers to establish that a tacit agreement
exists is found in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134
(1968). In that case the Supreme Court held: "In any event each petitioner can clearly
charge a combination between [the manufacturer] and himself, as of the day he unwill-
ingly complied with the restrictive franchise agreements,. . . or between [the manufac-
turer] and other franchise dealers, whose acquiescence in [the manufacturer's] firmly
enforced restraint was induced by 'the communicated danger of termination.'" Id. at
142 (quoting United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372 (1967)).




PROPOSALS FOR A NEw APPROACH
The theoretical inconsistencies and the evidentiary complica-
tions inherent in the current matrix of rules and principles gov-
erning vertical restraints necessitate an alternative approach. Such
an approach should be based on a comprehensive analysis of the
entire problem of vertical restraints, rather than on the piecemeal
approach that the Court has employed thus far.
A. Presumed Legality-The Appeal and the Resistance
The simplest solution would be to presume the legality of all
vertical restraints, except those that the dealers' collective action im-
poses on the manufacturer and those that facilitate agreement
among otherwise competing manufacturers.8 9 This would eliminate
the need for the many distinctions that have been the source of liti-
gation and the focus of academic scorn over the past seventy years.
The price-nonprice distinction, the difference between concerted
action and the manufacturer's independent refusal to deal, and the
question of whether an agency agreement is legitimate or merely a
sham, would all become irrelevant. In addition, a presumption that
vertical restraints were not anticompetitive would dispense with the
need to inquire into the competitive effect of the restraints.
The advantages of making vertical restrictions effectively per se
lawful go beyond administrative simplicity. This approach would
accord with the general economic intuition regarding manufacturer-
imposed restraints that forms the basis for most of the criticism of
Dr. Miles and its progeny. 90 Proponents of this theory argue that a
manufacturer will not choose to impose vertical restraints that limit
price competition among the dealers unless, in the manufacturer's
It's ok for a manufacturer to announce a suggested price, and to inform
the world that it will cut off anyone who doesn't comply, and it's ok for a
distributor to comply with the suggested price, and it's ok for the manu-
facturer to cut off any distributor that does not comply. But it's a per se
violation, subject to mandatory treble damages, for a manufacturer to
"threaten" to cut off a distributor, if the distributor tells the manufac-
turer that it will conform with the suggested prices.
Legal Times, Apr. 16, 1984, at 14, col. 3.
89 In theory, neither really represents an exception since in each case there is a
horizontal agreement and the normal rules governing such agreements would apply.
However, when parallel vertical restraints are imposed, it can be argued that to require
the plaintiff to prove the existence of a horizontal agreement, such as an agreement to
adopt the restraints or a price agreement facilitated by vertical restraints, is unnecessa-
rily burdensome especially because, frequently, there is no formal agreement, but
merely a tacit or implicit agreement of the kind often found in a tight oligopoly. But this
concern, even if legitimate, would not justify the blanket prohibition of vertical price
restraints.
90 See Telser, supra note 15.
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view, the restraints induce dealers to behave in such a way that the
product is made more attractive to the consumer than it would be
under vigorous intrabrand price competition. The manufacturer
benefits only if consumers view the product more favorably with the
restraints than without them.
This intuition is perhaps crude, but very powerful. Taken at
face value, it argues that consumers as a group cannot be harmed by
vertical restraints. 9' Moreover, this line of reasoning explains why
manufacturer-imposed restrictions and dealer cartels do not have
precisely the same impact on consumers. Dealers want to avoid in-
trabrand price competition, whether or not their actions are likely to
raise the overall demand for the product. If dealers avoid competi-
tion among themselves, they capture a larger percentage of the
profits even though the total profit pie shrinks. Therefore, while it
is possible that a dealer cartel will lead to nonprice activity that im-
proves the demand for the product, this is certainly not a necessary
result, and probably a highly unlikely one.92 Manufacturers, how-
ever, will impose vertical restraints only when such restraints would
increase demand for the product more than price competition
among dealers. In sum, manufacturers should not be prevented
from instituting vertical restraints because the manufacturers' inter-
ests in this area coincide with those of consumers.
However powerful and analytically appealing this approach ap-
pears, it does not yet command a consensus. Doctrinal inertia is the
most obvious of several possible explanations for the resistence to
the approach. For seventy years courts have consistently declared
vertical price restraints pernicious. Thus, they find it difficult to
confront the possibility that this view may have no validity. As a
result, courts tend to presume that a solid basis for this approach
exists, despite their difficulty in articulating it. Another possible ex-
planation for the judicial hostility towards vertical restraints is the
doctrine of stare decisis. Nevertheless this principle has not pre-
vented the Court from discarding unsatisfactory approaches to as-
pects of vertical restraints. For example, stare decisis did not
prevent the Sylvania Court from rejecting Schwinn's hostility toward
91 Dealer-imposed restraints or restraints that facilitate horizontal collusion among
manufacturers are exceptions. However, one commentator argues that these exceptions
will rarely be encountered. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53
ANTrrRUST LJ. 135, 141-42 (1984).
92 Even if it is theoretically possible that a horizontal agreement among dealers
would promote interbrand competition, it can be argued that dealers' motives are so
inherently untrustworthy that a per se prohibition is warranted. See R. POSNER & F. EAS-
TERBROOK, supra note 51, at 247-49 (discussing possibility that horizontal agreements
among dealers would increase interbrand competition in connection with United States




Some commentators that argue against the presumed legality of
manufacturer-imposed restrictions tentatively accept the economic
tenet that vertical restraints can enhance interbrand competition.
Nevertheless, they argue that manufacturers do not always behave
rationally. A manufacturer may impose vertical restraints even if
they make the product less attractive to consumers and reduce inter-
brand competition. This not only harms consumers, but it harms
the manufacturer as well. This is especially likely to be the case with
vertical price restraints.
Robert Steiner most clearly articulates this "mistake" theory. 94
Steiner argues that vertical restraints may assist the manufacturer in
the early years of the product's life cycle. Nonprice restraints that
induce dealer promotional efforts may help create a favorable image
for the product. But in Steiner's view, many manufacturers con-
tinue to impose the restraints longer than necessary. These manu-
facturers would benefit if discount retailers marketed the product,
because the product has established an image that no longer de-
pends on "full-service" retailers, or other dealer promotional ef-
forts. However, manufacturers, according to Steiner, often fail to
realize when their product has reached the point in its life cycle
where vertical restraints become detrimental.
While it would be foolish to argue that manufacturers never
make mistakes of the kind articulated by Steiner, if these were the
only circumstances under which vertical restraints could have an ad-
verse impact, the policy implications would be limited. Unless big
mistakes by manufacturers are the rule rather than the exception,
per se illegality for some or all forms of vertical restraints would be
unwarranted, since it would prevent the "correct" manufacturer
from implementing the most efficient policy. An intermediate policy
in which courts attempt to determine when the restraint is, in fact,
mistaken would be sensible only if one has confidence that courts
will be generally accurate (more accurate than the manufacturer) in
assessing when elimination of vertical restraints would improve
competition. 95
Other objections to presumptive legality come from commenta-
93 See supra notes 44-63 and accompanying text.
94 Steiner, Vertical Restraints and Economic Efficiency, FTC BUREAU OF ECON. WORKING
PAPER, No. 66 (June 1982). For a summary and discussion of Steiner's model as well as
an excellent summary of all the economic literature dealing with resale price mainte-
nance, see T. Overstreet, Jr., Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Theories and Empir-
ical Evidence (FTC Bureau of Economics Staff Report, Nov. 1983).
95 See T. Overstreet, Jr., supra note 94, at 28-30. Moreover, this is not a sufficient
reason to abandon the rule of presumed legality because doing so would increase uncer-
tainty and raise administrative costs. See Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 157-58.
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tors that reject the proposition that what benefits the manufacturer
necessarily benefits the consumer.96 These commentators also con-
cede that there are circumstances in which vertical restraints, per-
haps even resale price maintenance, may induce dealer services that
are critical in creating or expanding product demand. 97 However,
they observe that many products that were sold under fair trade and
many products that are now the focus of manufacturers' efforts to
restrict intrabrand price competition seem not to require extensive
dealer efforts to educate consumers or to provide other services that
are capable of being undermined by free-riders. Hence a manufac-
turer's efforts to insulate dealers from price competition are seen as
an attempt to differentiate its product from other similar products,
by inducing high-margin retailers to carry its product, and thereby
create a quality image, or by inducing dealers to engage in other
forms of nonprice marketing efforts that will not benefit consumers,
in part because it is likely that such efforts will merely offset similar
efforts by dealers of competing products.98
In response, one could argue that the possibility of quality certi-
fication by retailers creates an incentive for the manufacturer to pro-
duce quality merchandise. Even where the high priced item is
indistinguishable, apart from its label, from discount merchandise,
the imprimatur of the high priced retail establishments may increase
consumer utility by assuring the quality. Furthermore, the notion
that creating a favorable image for a product in order to increase
demand does not benefit consumers is based on a value judgment
that not all economists share. Finally, the argument that promo-
tional activities by dealers of competing manufacturers are largely
offsetting and therefore wasteful is incomplete without an explana-
tion of why a low-priced, no-frills product does not capture the bulk
of the demand.
Nonetheless, while subsequent discussion and research may al-
ter some economists' objections to vertical restraints, it is likely to
eliminate the possibility, as a matter of economic theory, that verti-
cal restraints can produce an anticompetitive effect. Moreover, as
the survey by Overstreet shows, the empirical research that has been
96 See, e.g., Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST LJ. 687 (1983);
see also Overstreet & Fisher, Resale Price Maintenance and Distributional Efficiency:
Some Lessons from the Past, (paper delivered at Western Economics Assoc., Int'l, 59th
Annual Conf., June 25, 1984; forthcoming in CONTEMPORARY POLICY ISSUES) (summariz-
ing other objections to vertical restraints).
97 See Scherer, supra note 96, at 692-94 (discussing such circumstances).
98 Levi Straus' efforts to maintain the price of blue jeans is put forward as a classic
example of a situation in which the dealer services argument is not relevant. See T.
Overstreet, Jr., supra note 94, at 120-22. For a discussion of the quality certification
explanation for resale price maintenance, see Marvel and McCafferty, Resale Price Mainte-
nance and Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346 (1984).
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done, while subject to severe methodological criticism, similarly fails
to support the proposition that vertical restraints are incapable of
producing anticompetitive results. 99
B. Replacing Per Se Rules with a Rule of Reason
The argument for presumptive or per se legality of vertical re-
straints loses some persuasiveness given the lack of consensus on
their possible impact. Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider al-
ternative approaches that would improve upon the status quo, while
avoiding the major objections to per se legality. One alternative is
to apply the rule of reason to all vertical restraints. This approach is
consistent with the spirit of the Sylvania decision.100 Furthermore, it
would avoid a difficult evidentiary requirement arising from the
Monsanto opinion: the need to distinguish between price and non-
price restraints.
Under the rule of reason analysis, the Colgate issue would still be
present, '0' but would no longer play such a critical role in determin-
ing the manufacturer's liability. Indeed, the Colgate doctrine could
be eliminated as an antitrust principle. The standard for establish-
ing concerted action would then be similar to the standard used in
cases involving horizontal restraints. In particular, when a manufac-
turer successfully coerces dealers to adhere to minimum prices, a
court would usually find that this constituted an agreement. In
practice, the Colgate defense of unilateral action would rarely suc-
ceed, and the analysis would focus on the restraint's effect on
competition.
Unfortunately, the Sylvania Court offered no guidance as to how
a court should conduct a rule of reason inquiry into vertical re-
straints. 10 2 The Sylvania Court probably did not intend that a lower
99 T. Overstreet, Jr., supra note 94, at 106-60. However, much of the empirical
research involves the period when resale price maintenance was protected by state fair
trade laws. Those laws added the state's enforcement power to that of the manufac-
turer. This factor would not be present if the prohibitions on vertical restraints are
relaxed. In addition, much fair trade stemmed from the collective activity of dealers,
rather than manufacturers. Restraints that result from dealer coercion, however, repre-
sent an exception to per se legality. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. Thus,
these circumstances diminish the relevance of this empirical study to the present policy
question.
100 This approach extends Sylvania by applying a rule of reason to price as well as
nonprice restraints. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
10l Nonprice restraints such as exclusive territories are likely to involve sufficient
formal interaction that the plaintiff will have no difficulty proving an agreement. Hence
the Colgate defense of unilateral action will not be available.
102 See Pitofsky, supra note 60, at 34.
There is no existing analytical framework for applying a rule of reason
generally, and certainly none for applying it to non-price vertical re-
straints. The technique of the Sylvania majority-quoting a long list of
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court perform a detailed analysis of the restraint's competitive im-
pact. Courts have generally resisted that kind of full-scale inquiry,
favoring rules of thumb or other specific guidelines.10 3 Further-
more, rules of thumb were pervasive in vertical restraint cases prior
to Sylvania.10 4
A particular source of confusion is the Sylvania Court's instruc-
tion to balance the loss of intrabrand competition against the gain in
interbrand competition. As Frank Easterbrook points out,10 5 the
notion that there is a tradeoff to be measured is a false one. If the
vertical restraint works for the manufacturer in the way suggested by
the theory, the product is made more attractive to consumers (in the
aggregate) despite the possible higher retail price. But if this is so,
it is meaningless to speak of a reduction in intrabrand competition,
since the ones whose interests are supposed to matter, the consum-
ers, are better off. The only real question, therefore, is whether the
restraint works in the suggested way, i.e. whether consumers are in
fact better off. The Court is silent on how the trier of fact is sup-
posed to decide this issue, and a review of the relevant economic
literature hardly makes one optimistic about the feasibility of such
an empirical inquiry.
C. A Structural Analysis: Injecting Economic Reality into
Legal Rules
There exists an alternative approach that avoids a full scale eco-
nomic inquiry without immunizing all vertical restraints: a struc-
tural analysis. The goal of such an analysis is not to assess the actual
impact of a particular restraint, but to determine from the nature of
the restraint and from industry characteristics whether this type of
restraint is likely to have an adverse impact on competition. The
inquiry is similar in spirit to analysis of mergers under section 7 of
the Clayton Act.' 06
factors without any indication of priority or weight to be accorded each
factor-unfortunately is standard operating procedure.
Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 53-68.
The approach mandated by Sylvania might have been intended merely to distinguish
individual manufacturer-imposed restraints from those resulting from dealer coercion
and restraints resulting from collusion among manufacturers. This analysis is equivalent
to the policy of presumptive legality for truly vertical restraints. As suggested earlier,
this approach accords with basic economic theory. Nevertheless, such an approach is
resisted by those perceiving a potential evil in all vertical restraints, even in those result-
ing from individual manufacturer-imposed price restrictions.
103 See Hay, supra note 4, at 133 (discussing such rules of thumb).
104 See supra text accompanying notes 7-52.
105 See Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 155-56.
106 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). Section 7 is generally characterized as mandating an in-
cipiency standard. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1961) ("[fIt
is apparent that a keystone [of § 7] was its provision of authority for arresting mergers at
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A structural analysis requires that a court examine the charac-
teristics of the industry involved. The manufacturer's market share,
along with the level of concentration in the industry, are important
characteristics.10 7 For example, if the firm imposing the restraint
has little market power and if the industry is vigorously competitive,
then it is difficult for the restraint, however pernicious in theory, to
have any anticompetitive impact of consequence. The consumer has
an array of alternatives; if the restraint does not make the manufac-
turer's product a better value in the consumer's mind, the restraint
will cause a reduction in the manufacturer's market share. This
prospect should deter the manufacturer from initiating the restraint;
if it does not, the adverse consequences to consumers would be de
minimis.
This structural screening process should satisfy advocates of
the mistake theory'08 along with those who believe that manufactur-
ers can use vertical restraints to enhance their market power or to
benefit from their existing market strength.'0 9 The basic disadvan-
tage of the method is that the economic intuition regarding vertical
a time when the trend to a lessening of competition . . . was still in its incipiency.").
Because § 7 is concerned with the likelihood rather than the actuality of an anticompeti-
tive effect, the type of analysis used in merger situations is arguably inappropriate in § 1
Sherman Act cases, such that, except for per se offenses, the plaintiff must establish that
the restraint has an anticompetitive effect. However, the inquiry discussed here is not
dissimilar to that used in other Sherman Act issues, such as tie-in cases, where the in-
quiry focuses on certain structural features, such as the degree of market power, and
avoids any real inquiry into the actual competitive effect.
107 Concentration is not, however, the only structural indicator of the presence or
absence of competitive pressure. Other structural features can negate or exacerbate the
effect of concentration. Although these other features could be included in the analysis,
it would become more complicated. See Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Law,
67 CORNELL L. REv. 439, 447-57 (1982) (discussing other structural features influencing
competition).
Fisher and Overstreet suggest having the legality of resale price maintenance efforts
by a single manufacturer depend on whether the practice is prevalent in the industry.
Overstreet & Fisher, supra note 96, at 17. The more common the practice, they point
out, the greater the risk that it will facilitate collusion among manufacturers or lead to
other anticompetitive effects. Hence resale price maintenance would be presumed not
to be anticompetitive where the practice is not prevalent in the industry.
While the authors may be correct in linking the anticompetitive potential to the
prevalence of the practice, their policy conclusions are problematic. They make the law-
fulness of one firm's actions depend on other firms' behavior. Moreover, there may be a
perceived unfairness if the rule immunizes the first firms to institute resale price mainte-
nance. Fisher and Overstreet's suggestions are more feasible if the case is brought
under § 5 of the FTC Act, which does not allow treble damages, seeking an industry
wide cease-and-desist order. See also Easterbrook, supra note 58, at 158-67 (discussing
market power and prevalence of use along with other possible filters).
108 See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
109 Those who believe that the effect of some vertical restraints is to trick the con-
sumer into paying more for the product than its intrinsic value may not be entirely satis-
fied with this structural screen. They might view the restraint as an attempt to
significantly increase market power regardless of the initial structural conditions.
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restraints, i.e. that manufacturers have an incentive to institute verti-
cal restraints only when they improve the attractiveness of the man-
ufacturer's product, extends even to a manufacturer who is a
complete monopolist, since by making its product more attractive to
consumers, the monopolist shifts the demand curve out. Therefore,
although structural screening minimizes the risk of allowing a firm
with market power to engage in vertical restraints that have an an-
ticompetitive effect, some benefits to consumers will be lost when
the screen prevents firms with market power from implementing
beneficial restraints. 10
The magnitude of this loss depends largely on how narrowly
the market power criterion is defined. The spirit of the structural
inquiry would appear to suggest a definition of market power that
would be satisfied only in situations approximating monopoly (in
the traditional Sherman Act sense) or reasonably tight oligopoly.
Unfortunately, in other situations where a structural screen has
been used, e.g., tie-in cases, the definition of market power that is
employed seems often to be satisfied by any firm with a differenti-
ated product regardless of the intensity of competition with rival
producers of similar products. Such a narrow criterion would frus-
trate the primary purpose of a structural screen, especially since ver-
tical restraints are most likely to be found in markets where
manufacturers' products are differentiated from one another, or
where the purpose of the restraint is precisely to accomplish such
differentiation by offering the consumer a superior alternative or
greater confidence in the performance characteristics of an existing
alternative.
Another possible approach to vertical restraints would be to ex-
amine briefly the manufacturer's reasons for implementing the re-
straint. For example, a court might examine the nature of the
product and the manufacturer's distribution system to see if the
dealers' promotional activities are subject to free-riding. The court
would then assess the importance of those activities to the effective
marketing of the product.'' If the court found a plausible business
justification for the restraint, not anticompetitive on its face, there
would be no further inquiry. Furthermore, a court could combine
this approach with a structural screen. For instance, courts could
1O This assumes that a restraint that does not pass the structural screen would be
presumed anticompetitive. An alternative approach is to conduct a full scale economic
inquiry when market power exists. However, the increased uncertainty and administra-
tive costs of this approach may be unacceptable.
1I The inquiry would determine whether the restraints were a reasonable solution
to the free-rider problem, but would not require the manufacturer to establish that no
other alternative was available. Such second guessing would impose inordinate burdens
on a manufacturer contemplating a solution to its free-rider problem.
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treat vertical restraints by firms without market power as per se legal
while examining briefly the business justification behind all other
vertical restraints. Alternatively, courts could use rebuttable pre-
sumptions whereby the burden would shift depending on the manu-
facturer's market power and the plausibility of the restraint's
justification. 112
A potentially controversial aspect of the inquiry into the plausi-
bility of the business motive arises where the restraint is designed to
promote a quality image by inducing stores having an established
reputation for carrying quality merchandise to carry the manufac-
turer's product. Although this image-creating activity is subject to
free-riding from discount stores, some commentators argue that this
activity is less worthy of protection than more traditional dealer ac-
tivities and consequently should not be immunized.' 13
Casual empiricism suggests that manufacturers attempt to re-
duce intrabrand competition through image enhancement as often
as they attempt to do so with traditional dealer services. Hence, the
requirement for a full rule of reason inquiry for all vertical restraints
designed to enhance the product's image would diminish the sav-
ings possible under the simplifying procedures suggested above.
Moreover, there will be much litigation over whether the actual pur-
pose of the restraint is image enhancement. Therefore, practical
considerations argue against discriminating between image creating
activities and other types of vertical restraints especially where mar-
ket power is limited.
CONCLUSION
This article has considered the status of vertical restraint analy-
sis in the wake of the recent Supreme Court decision in Monsanto Co.
v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. It is likely that Monsanto does not represent
the last word on vertical restraints. Several issues remain un-
resolved; indeed, Monsanto might have raised as many questions as it
resolved. No satisfactory equilibrium will be reached until the
Court undertakes a comprehensive analysis of vertical restraints,
rather than reacting piecemeal to individual issues as they arise.
The cornerstone of a comprehensive approach is an analysis of the
manufacturer's motives in instituting a vertical restraint from which
conclusions may be drawn about the effect that restraint may have
112 See Joskow & KIevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE
L.J. 213 (1979) (advocating similar approach in predatory pricing cases); see also Over-
street, supra note 94, at 170-76 (discussing possibility of structural inquiry without advo-
cating any particular set of rules).
113 See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
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on competition. In turn, appropriate policy measures could be
formulated.
The basic economic intuition supports per se legality for verti-
cal restraints. However, there are enough variants on the basic
model that it cannot be stated with confidence that vertical restraints
are incapable of generating adverse competitive consequences. At
the same time, a full economic inquiry into the actual impact of
every vertical restraint would place an overwhelming burden on the
courts, with few guidelines for conducting such an inquiry. Hence,
this Article considered approaches to vertical restraints short of a
traditional rule of reason treatment.
The easiest approach would limit section 1 scrutiny to restraints
imposed on manufacturers by dealers acting collectively, and to re-
straints instituted in concert by supposedly competing manufactur-
ers. In essence, this adopts per se legality for truly vertical
restraints. Because such a policy would not satisfy all concerns
about vertical restraints, this Article considered other ways to screen
out the potentially troublesome restraints. A distinction between
price and nonprice restraints is neither helpful in this regard, nor
warranted by economic theory. In addition, this distinction causes
considerable evidentiary problems.
The most attractive screening process would limit rule of rea-
son analysis to restraints conducted by manufacturers enjoying mar-
ket power. A second screening approach, which could be used to
complement the first, would examine the plausibility of the business
justification for the restraint.
These intermediate solutions will not appease those who argue
that manufacturer-imposed restraints cannot cause competitive
harm. Nor will they satisfy those who support per se prohibitions of
resale price maintenance. Nevertheless, the current rules covering
vertical restraints are unsatisfactory. If per se legality for vertical
restraints is too bold, then these suggested approaches may provide
the most viable alternatives for improvement.
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